The Extent of the Fall
Rom. v. 14.
Nevertheless, death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam’s transgression, who is the figure of him that was to come.
Of whom speaks the Apostle here? He speaks of two extraordinary persons; the one the type, the other the antitype,—the latter at once similar and superior to the former. In what sense the first Adam was a type of the second, it is easy to see. The one was a federal head no less than the other. The covenant of redemption was made with the last Adam. The covenant of works was made with the first. This accounts for the universality of death, of which the Apostle speaks in the words prefixed to this Lecture. Death is the consequence of sin; and, therefore, as all have sinned, all die. Infants, indeed, cannot sin in their own persons. But they were represented by Adam in the covenant of works; and, therefore, sinned in him, and fell with him when he sinned and fell. This text reminds me of the Answer to the following Question in the Catechism—Did all mankind fall in Adam’s first transgression? The Answer runs thus—The covenant being made with Adam, not only for himself, but for his posterity, all mankind, descending from him by ordinary generation, sinned in him, and fell with him, in his first transgression.
Having already considered the fall of man, sin in general, and that particular sin to which this fall was immediately owing, I am now to ascertain the extent of the fall.
Of the covenant to which this answer refers, I have given you an account in a preceding Lecture. It is commonly known by the name of the covenant of works. It is here said to have been made with Adam. On this account is he, in the text which introduces this Lecture, affirmed to have been a type of him that was to come; that is of Jesus Christ, stiled the second Adam, and, to intimate his high original, the Lord from heaven. It is said, as I observed on a former occasion, to have been made with Adam, not with the man and the woman conjunctly, but with the man as contradistinguished from the woman. It was made with Adam as a public person. So the answer speaks—The covenant was made with Adam not for himself only, but for his posterity, &c. We are informed here both negatively and positively, for whom it was made with Adam;
Negatively, It was not for himself only. Here are two things; it was for himself, but not for himself only.
First, It was made for himself. He himself was included in it. The consequences of the fulfilment or non-fulfilment were to affect himself, as well as his posterity. In other words, the life promised in it, on the one hand, and the death threatened in it, on the other, respected him as well as them. If the condition of the covenant was fulfilled, he was to live. If it was not fulfilled, he was to die.
Secondly, It was not made for himself only. Both the life promised and the death threatened in the covenant extended to others as well as to Adam himself. Whether he stood or fell, he was neither to stand nor fall alone. If he stood, his posterity were to stand with him. If, on the other hand, he fell, they were to fall with him.—We are told
Positively for whom the covenant was made with Adam. It was made with him, not only for himself, but for his posterity; and the remaining part of the answer ascertains the extent in which we are to understand his posterity here. On a former occasion I hinted, that the adversaries of our holy religion, of whose cavils and exceptions there is no end, have often arraigned this part of the divine conduct. The supposition that God entered into a covenant with Adam, as our representative, without our knowledge and consent, they say, is inconsistent with the just ideas and notions of God and his perfections. But was it, in fact, unjust, or, in any respect, unworthy of God to call Adam to represent us in a covenant, into which he entered with him long before we had a being; and to the making of which we could not, in our own persons, consent? A candid examination of the matter must satisfy every unprejudiced person, that it was not only consistent with the justice of God to enter into such a covenant with Adam, as the representative of his posterity, but manifested much of his goodness. Let us attend to the following things.
(1.) God in sovereignty condescended far when he entered into a covenant with man, especially a covenant of such a gracious tenor. Great was the disparity between the parties contracting in this covenant; the one the Creator, the other his creature. Whatever the former was pleased to command, the latter was indispensably bound to do. The one could not command any thing unjust or unreasonable. The other, therefore, could not lawfully decline any thing which the former might enjoin upon him.
Most just and equitable were the terms of this covenant. Nothing was required of Adam in it, but what he was naturally and necessarily bound to do, except what related to the tree of knowledge. Now might not this tree have been withheld from him, though no covenant had been made with him? Might not the rightful proprietor and Sovereign of the world do with his own as he pleased; granting to man one thing, and withholding from him another, as he in sovereignty might think most fit? Might not man, though no covenant had been made with him, have sinned; forfeiting all the felicity which he possessed, and incurring all the misery threatened in the covenant? No covenant, as we have often observed, so far as we have heard, was made with the angels; and yet that a great part of them fell, depriving themselves of their original dignity, and subjecting themselves to endless misery, we all know.
Naturally and necessarily was man under the moral law. That law, though it never had been reduced to the form of a proper covenant, man might have violated. Now, would not the violation of it, as a law, have subjected man to the whole punishment which he incurred by the breach of it as a covenant? Must not the wages of sin ever be death? Might not man, therefore, have been in a situation no less ticklish and critical, on the supposition that no covenant had been made with him? Did not the covenant place him on a ground, and in circumstances more advantageous and favourable than he ever otherwise could have been? Did not the fulfilment of it entitle him to higher degrees of dignity than perfect obedience to the law, as such, ever could have entitled him? Can a creature in any situation or circumstances merit any thing at the hand of the Creator? No. All that man without such a covenant could have claimed as his due, in the event of perfect and perpetual obedience, was impunity or exemption from punishment. On the supposition that no such covenant had been made with Adam, must not the felicity of each individual of his numerous posterity have depended on his own personal conduct. In how precarious and dangerous a situation would this have placed us all! If Adam, notwithstanding the adult state in which he was created, and his many other singular advantages, sinned and fell, what reason is there to fear that each of us in our own persons might have sinned and fallen? How precarious and uncertain on such a hypothesis must the obedience and felicity of mankind, to the latest ages of time, have been! But, in virtue of the covenant, the obedience of one man was to insure the final felicity of all mankind. To yourselves, therefore, I appeal. Had you been on the spot, and had it in your option to have been represented by Adam, and your final felicity insured by his obedience, or to have stood or fallen for yourselves severally, whether, all circumstances considered, would you have preferred the former or the latter?—For,
(2.) Was not the person, chosen to be our representative in the covenant of works, in all respects most fit for such an important station? Was he not, in every view, equal to the great task? Was he not at once able and inclined to do all that was required of him in the covenant? He who made him, and entered into covenant with him, furnished him with every thing necessary to fulfil the condition of that covenant. What the second Adam, at an after period, said, the first Adam, during his original state, could say, I delight to do thy will, O my God! thy law is within my heart.
Was not the representative most intimately related to the persons represented by him, and had he not the most endearing affection for them? He was their father. They are his children. He was their natural root; and, therefore, he was the most proper person to be their federal head. Conformed to the holy law in the one table, as well as the other, he loved God supremely; and he loved others of the human kind as he did himself. Their felicity, as well as his own, lay very near his heart. His own felicity, no less than ours, was at stake. If he obeyed, he obeyed for himself, as well as for us. If, on the other hand, he disobeyed, the consequences of his disobedience were to affect himself, no less than us.
Adam’s probationary state, in all probability, was intended to be but short. How soon, therefore, in the event of his obedience, would the perpetual happiness of all mankind have been insured, and not so much as a possibility of their ruin left! But, had no covenant been made with Adam, the felicity of many of them must have been for many ages doubtful and uncertain. May not Satan be supposed to have been, at that early period, a less dangerous enemy than now? Must he not then have been less experienced and versant in the various arts of seduction?
Upon the whole, considering Adam’s peculiar advantages, must we not allow, that, had we been present at the federal transaction between God and him, we would most readily have agreed, that it was more eligible and safe for us to have our everlasting felicity insured by the obedience of our first father, as our federal head, than that it should depend on our own personal behaviour.
(3.) If we find fault with this part of the divine conduct, must it not be for one or another of the reasons following,—either on account of the person whom the Creator chose to represent us in the covenant of works,—or of the terms of the covenant itself,—or, in a word, of the pretended injustice of every federal representation, by which the consequences of the behaviour of an individual extend to others as well as to himself.
On the first account we certainly cannot find fault with the covenant of works. Our first father, no doubt, was in every view the most eligible person in the universe to be our federal head.—Nor can it be for the second reason. Were not the terms of the covenant most advantageous and favourable for us? How condescending and gracious was God in treating with his own creature in the way of a proper covenant, in which there were stipulations, and re-stipulations! Did God solemnly bind man to fulfil the condition of the covenant? No less solemnly did he oblige himself that, in the event of the fulfilment of the condition by man, he would infallibly perform the promissory part of it in its fullest extent to him. How good, as well as just, does God appear in the covenant! Not only was a reward offered and insured in the covenant, but a reward to which, in point of worth and duration, man’s obedience, though perfected, could bear no proportion.—Neither can we object to the covenant on the last account; for, if every federal representation be unjust and unfair, then the covenant of redemption made with the second Adam, no less than the covenant of works made with the first, must be incompatible with justice. If it be a just thing for the one federal head to represent a part of mankind in his covenant, must it not have been fully consistent with justice for the other to represent all mankind in his covenant? Far, indeed, are the two federal heads from being on a level. Infinitely is the second Adam superior to the first. But was not the first Adam, though in all respects inferior to the second, a fit person to represent mankind in the covenant of works?
The remaining part of the answer informs us of the extent in which we are to understand Adam’s posterity here. By his posterity, whom he represented in the covenant of works, we must understand all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation, &c. To a superficial reader, the restriction in these words, descending from him by ordinary generation, may seem unnecessary. But the design and view with which it is inserted is obvious. It is to exclude the second Adam; who, as man, was one of the posterity of the first Adam,—but did not descend from him by ordinary generation. That, in respect of his manhood, he was a descendent of Adam, the inspired writers, in the account they give of his genealogy, expressly inform us. Matth. i. Luke iii. That he descended from Adam in an extraordinary way is, in the chapters referred to, in terms sufficiently plain, intimated to us. The reason of the preternatural conception of the Man Christ Jesus, and his extraordinary birth, is manifest. Natural generation, as we will see in the sequel, is the channel in which the universal corruption of nature is transmitted from Adam to his posterity. In order, therefore, that the humanity of Jesus Christ might be exempted from it, it was conceived in a manner till then unknown and unprecedented in the world. Thus was he in his birth, as well as his life and death, holy and harmless, undefiled and separated from sinners. But more of this afterwards.
Did the first Adam represent in the covenant of works such as descend from him by ordinary generation? Did the second Adam, as man, descend from him by a generation wholly preternatural and extraordinary? It follows, of course, that the humanity of the second Adam could not be represented by the first in his covenant. If he was not represented by Adam in the covenant of works, he could not sin in him, and fall with him in his first transgression. These words in the end of the answer, sinned in him, and fell with him, must, therefore, be restricted to his natural posterity; that is, all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation. Accordingly, on this part of the subject, I mean to do three things; to shew that all mankind, descending from Adam by ordinary generation, sinned in him, and fell with him, in his first transgression; to shew how it came to pass that multitudes sinned in him, and fell with him, by a transgression which was committed before they were actually in being; and to point out the channel in which sin is conveyed from the first man to the numerous individuals of his posterity.
I. I shall endeavour to show, that all mankind, descending from Adam by ordinary generation, sinned in him, and fell with him, in his first transgression. Now, that all mankind sinned in Adam, and consequently, as his natural descendents, come into the world sinners, will appear from the following considerations.
First, The express declarations of the word of God. To introduce a multiplicity of proofs here is unnecessary. A passage or two may suffice. By one man, says the Apostle, sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned. Rom. v. 12. In what extent are the Apostle’s words here to be understood? Whom does he intend by the all that have sinned? Is it to be understood of a part of mankind only? No. Sin is of equal extent with death. The universality, therefore, of the latter, evinces the universality of the former. That all die, experience, no less than scripture, evinces. Do not infants, as well as adults, die? If death be the effect of sin, and if infants die, infants must be sinners. Sin they cannot commit in their own persons. How then come they to be sinners? The Apostle accounts for it. In the last clause of the verse he speaks thus—for that, or as the phrase has often been rendered, in whom, that is, in Adam, the one man, by whom sin entered first into the world, all have sinned. And, agreeably to the Apostle, the Compilers of the Catechism account for it thus—all mankind, descending from him by ordinary generation, sinned in him, and fell with him, in his first transgression—For we have before proved both Jews and Gentiles that they are all under sin. For all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God. Rom. iii. 9, 23. Nothing can be more explicit and full than the Apostolic assertion. That infants, as well as adult persons, are included is manifest; for, as I said already, the former, no less than the latter, die. The former, therefore, as has also been observed, no less than the latter, have sinned. Now, the only way in which they can be supposed to have sinned is expressed in the answer. And is not this the only way in which it can be accounted for?
Secondly, The universal practical corruption of mankind. That men of all ages, the young as well as the old, and of all stations and conditions, the high and the low, the rich and the poor, are sinners, the scripture declares, and daily experience shows. How comes it to pass that the contagion is so universal? Is it not from an inbred propensity to evil in all the descendents of fallen Adam? Is not original sin the spring of all actual sins? Do not the latter flow from the former as streams from the fountain? Vain is it to alledge that the universal practical depravation of the human race, which none can deny, and which every good man observes with deep regret, is the effect of bad example. This method of accounting for it does not comport with well known facts. It is easy to produce instances of children brought up under the immediate inspection of godly parents, removed from bad examples of every kind, and yet discovering an invention to find out, and an inclination to practise, vices which they never saw practised by others; nay, of which they never had access to hear or read. Is not this a certain proof of a natural propensity and inclination to evil, and all evil; as well as an aversion and disinclination to good, and all good? Is it not a demonstration of the dismal truth of which I am now attempting a short illustration? All mankind, descending from the first Adam by ordinary generation, sinned in him, and fell with him, in his first transgression; and, therefore, they come into the world sinners; not only obnoxious to punishment for their original father’s first sin, but naturally inclined to commit sin in their own persons. This inbred inclination they begin at an early period to discover. Even before they can distinguish between the right hand and the left, or discern what is good and what is evil, they discover an aversion to the former, and a propension to the latter. This is that over-flowing fountain, from which proceeds that universal deluge of wickedness which has long overspread the face of the whole earth. What a black picture of mankind in the fallen state does the Apostle exhibit to us! They are all gone out of the way, they are together become unprofitable; there is none that doth good, no not one. Their throat is an open sepulchre; with their tongues they have used deceit; the poison of asps is under their lips: whose mouth is full of cursing and bitterness. Their feet are swift to shed blood. Destruction and misery are in their ways: And the way of peace have they not known. There is no fear of God before their eyes. Rom. iii. 12,—18.
Thirdly, From the universality of the effects of sin among the descendents of fallen Adam. That death is the effect of sin, or that man could not have been subjected to it, had he not sinned, we endeavoured to prove in a preceding Lecture. That sin is the cause, death the effect, the Apostle affirms in the most express manner in the already quoted Rom. v. 12. That death passes upon infants incapable of committing sin, of which we have repeatedly taken notice, as well as adults who have committed it, the Apostle teaches in the words prefixed to this Lecture. Is death the effect of sin? Does death befal infants, who cannot have committed sin in their own persons? Then they must have sinned in another, or the sin of another must be imputed to them, and it must be on account of it that they are exposed to death.
This point, otherwise inexplicable, the answer explains on principles the most consistent and satisfactory. All mankind, descending from Adam by ordinary generation, sinned in him in his first transgression; and, therefore, by that sin, though they be guilty of no other, are they obnoxious to death.—I am
II. To show how it comes to pass that Adam’s first sin extends to all his natural descendents, and they come to be accountable for it. How come they to be accountable for a sin, to the commission of which they could not be accessory? The question has been obviated. The preceding part of the answer sufficiently explains and accounts for it. The covenant was made with Adam for his posterity, as well as for himself; and consequently they, as really as he, are amenable for the violation of it. That it was made with Adam for his natural posterity, as well as for himself; that he was the most proper person to represent us in it; that we could have had no objection to his representing us in it, had we been present at the making of it, and our personal consent been asked,—we saw already. Now, if the covenant was made with him as our representative, what he, in that capacity, did must be in equity placed to our account, and we must be concerned in it, no less than if we had done it in our own persons. Whether he obeyed or disobeyed, stood or fell, he did so for us then in his loins, as our first father, and represented by him, as our federal head. While he obeyed we obeyed. When he disobeyed we disobeyed. While he stood we stood. When he fell we fell. The sin he committed, the guilt he contracted, is placed to our account, no less than if we ourselves had committed the former, and contracted the latter. A nobleman or gentleman is convicted of high-treason against his earthly sovereign. What is the consequence? He forfeits his estate, as well as his life. Does he forfeit his estate for himself only? No. The forfeiture extends to his posterity, as well as himself.—Was not Adam guilty of the most unnatural, as well as inexcusable and aggravated rebellion against his great sovereign? Are not we, his children, like our unhappy father, most daring rebels against Heaven? How just, as well as doleful, the complaint! Hear, O heavens! and give ear, O earth! for the Lord hath spoken, I have nourished and brought up children, but they have rebelled against me. Isa. i. 2. I am
III. To consider the way in which sin is conveyed from Adam to the numerous individuals of his posterity descending from him by ordinary generation. The answer is conceived in terms calculated not only to restrict the transmission of sin from Adam to his natural posterity, or ordinary descendents, but to intimate the mysterious channel and mode of communication from him to them. Now, that natural generation is the channel by which sin descends from Adam to his posterity, which the answer evidently intimates, is necessarily implied in a number of places of holy writ. I shall only remind you of the following. Adam lived an hundred and thirty years, and begat a son in his own likeness, after his image; and he called his name Seth. Gen. v. 3. Adam himself had been created an upright and holy man. Now, he was a sinful and corrupt man. Accordingly, his own likeness, or image, after which he begat Seth, is here apposed to the image and likeness of God, after which he himself had been created. Gen. i. 26, 27. Is there not a plain intimation here of the mysterious channel, through which the universal depravity of human nature, in the now lapsed state, is communicated by father to son, from Adam to the latest posterity? Was Seth a corrupt and sinful man? Whence did his depravity spring? In what did it originate? Was it owing to the influence of bad example? No. It was of an earlier original. He had it from his very conception in the womb. His father begat, and his mother conceived, him a sinful man. His father was a corrupt person; and, therefore, the son also was corrupt. For, saith the text, Adam begat a son in his own likeness, and after his own image; that is, in the very act of begetting, he communicated that impurity and depravity of nature, in which the son resembled the father.—In similar terms speaks the Psalmist—Behold, I was shapen in iniquity; and in sin did my mother conceive me. Psal. li. 5. The occasion on which this penitential Psalm was composed is well known. David had been permitted not only to commit the foul sin of adultery, but to perpetrate the barbarous crime of murder. These sins he considers as streams, and traces them to the fountain; the impurity, and corruption of nature, with which he was conceived and born. For, says he, I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me. My parents were sinners, and, in virtue of my descent from them, I am a sinner. It was not by imitating their bad example that I first became a sinner. My sin is of a much earlier date. It is of equal duration with my existence. I was begotten of a sinful father, and born of a sinful mother; and from them sin was communicated to me.
Accordingly, as a strong proof that natural generation is the mysterious channel by which the moral impurity of our nature is conveyed from parents to children, our blessed Redeemer, as man, in order that his humanity might escape that moral pollution which is common to all other men, was conceived and born in a preternatural and miraculous manner. For, as the evangelical prophet speaks, in a passage expressly applied to the Messiah in the New Testament, A virgin shall conceive, and, still remaining a virgin, shall bring forth a son. That it was in order to his escaping the moral impurity of nature that he was conceived in this extraordinary and unparalleled manner the scripture oftener than once intimates to us. For, said the angel unto the virgin-mother, The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee; therefore also that holy thing which shall be born of thee, shall be called the Son of God; that is, thou shalt be found with child in a manner altogether unprecedented and miraculous; and, therefore, that which shall be born of thee, shall be a holy thing.
Mysterious, indeed, is the manner in which sin is communicated and conveyed from Adam to his posterity. A profound mystery, no doubt, it is. Many mysteries are there in the natural as well as the moral world. What a mystery is human generation itself! As to the corruption of our nature, which in this mysterious manner is propagated from generation to generation, it certainly cannot be of God. Carefully, therefore, must we distinguish between our nature and the depravity of it. The former is the workmanship of God, not the latter. The case, so far as we can conceive it, stands thus. At a particular period, posterior to our conception, when the body is properly organized and fitted for the reception of the soul, the latter is created and infused into the former. Thus both the constituent parts of our nature, in respect of their substance, are of God. He is the Creator and former of both. But in the formation of them he withholds what a subsequent answer calls original righteousness; that is, that conformity to the holy law, with which human nature was endued in its original state. Hence it only is in respect of its substance that the soul comes from God. He withholds original righteousness from it; and, in its unition to the body, it is infected with moral corruption, in a manner which no man on earth can pretend fully to understand.
There is only one thing farther in the answer to which we need to attend. All mankind, descending from Adam by ordinary generation, sinned in him, and fell with him, in his first transgression. His first transgression was not his last. Innumerable other sins did he afterwards commit. But, by his first transgression, he violated the covenant of works; and, therefore, immediately ceased to stand and act in the capacity of our representative, and federal head. Afterwards he acted only in a private capacity; and, therefore, he only was amenable for his after conduct. Accordingly, when the Compilers of the Catechism give us an account of original sin, and mention, as a branch of it, the guilt of Adam’s sin imputed to us, they expressly restrict it to his first sin.
Having finished what I intended as an exposition of this answer, I shall conclude with a reflection or two for improvement. And
First, Truly God was good to man in his first state. Though the covenant, made with the first Adam, was not, in such a manner as the covenant made with the second, a covenant of grace, yet gracious and good was God to man in the former, as well as in the latter. Eminently is wisdom manifested in the choice of so fit a person to represent us in that covenant. Signally did God display his goodness in insuring to Adam and to us such a rich and glorious reward, in the event of the fulfilment of its condition.
Secondly, We see on the one hand the analogy, and on the other the disparity, between the manner in which God dealt with man in his first, and the manner in which he deals with him in his now fallen state. It hath pleased God all along to deal with man through the intervention of a covenant. Well did the covenant of works befit man in his original state. Admirably is the covenant with the second Adam adapted to the situation of the persons whom he represents in it. What reason had Adam to be thankful, and to wonder when his great Creator proposed a covenant of such a gracious tenor! Especially have we reason to be thankful for the revelation of a covenant so much adapted to our fallen state. Thanks be to God for all his favours. Thanks, in an especial manner, be to him for Jesus Christ.
Thirdly, How unreasonably, as well as unlawfully, do we often impeach and quarrel with the divine conduct! How ready are we to blame God for permitting sin to enter into the world, and especially for making us responsible for a sin which we did not commit? But in great wisdom and goodness, as well as justice and equity, as I observed already, did God enter into a covenant with Adam as our representative; and for permitting him to violate it, and by the violation of it to introduce both moral and penal evil into the world, he had the most important and worthy reasons. What ignorance and what prejudice do we discover when we presume to find fault with God, or with any of his works and ways! Often does that which is straight appear to us crooked. Apt are the best of men in the state of imperfection, through the remainder of indwelling corruption, to be mistaken about God and his mysterious conduct. What he intends for their good, may appear to them to tend to their hurt.
Fourthly, We all evince ourselves to be fallen creatures. At a very early period do we discover this. What an epidemical disease is sin! How universal a contagion is it! Long ago did the Lord look down from heaven upon the children of men, to see if there were any that did understand and seek God. They are all gone aside. They are altogether become filthy; there is none that doeth good, no not one.
Fifthly, We see whence the wickedness, which, as a universal deluge, has overspread the face of our earth, originally flows. All the crimes and sins which have been committed in our own times, and in the days of our fathers, may be traced back to the first sin of our first federal head; all the sins which we have committed in the several past periods and stages of our life, to the corruption and depravity of nature in which we were conceived. What an infathomable depth of depravity and deceit in the human heart!
Lastly, If we ever enter into eternal life, it must be in the way of a covenant very different from that made with the first Adam, and in all respects superior to it. But how encouraging to think, that, as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive; and that, as sin hath reigned unto death, even so grace reigns through righteousness, unto eternal life, by Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.